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This paper provides a narrative account of the 1980s Chilean banking crisis.  The Chilean crisis saw 
the nationalization of the two largest financial conglomerates and resulted in more than half of the 
financial system’s assets and liabilities falling under direct control of the government.  The paper 
provides details of the bank rescue measures as well as the resolution of the banks' nonperforming 
debt problem.  By providing a detailed chronology of the financial crisis, the paper highlights the 
evolutionary process that characterized the interventions taken by the Chilean authorities to restore 
the financial system to solvency.  Despite the pessimism that accompanied the early stages of the 
banking crisis, the fifteen-year process of intervention, restructuring, and recapitalization left the 
financial system well-positioned to finance Chile’s economic growth, which averaged six percent 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  On January 13, 1983 the Chilean government took over the flagship banks of the two largest 
economic groups in Chile, intervened in another three smaller banks, and forced the liquidation of 
another three financial institutions.  Government authorities then took control of the business groups 
by refusing to renew thirty-day loans to the companies affiliated with the banks, thereby forcing 
them into bankruptcy. On this day Chile's initial experiment with bank privatization, which began in 
1975, came to an end.   
  This paper provides a narrative account of the twenty year period of bank privatization in 
Chile.  Previous papers—especially Larraín (1989) and Velasco (1991)—have provided accounts of 
the financial interventions up to the late 1980s but not of the final recapitalization of the banks that 
took place in 1996.1  Sanhueza (1999), Barandiarán and Hernández (1999), and Reinstein and 
Rosende (2000) are comprehensive studies of the financial crisis, but they do not focus on the 
chronology of the crisis and its resolution.  This paper gives an accessible narrative account of the 
events between 1975 and 1996 that are important for understanding the 1981-1985 crisis and its ten-
year resolution.  The paper’s focus on the evolution of policies over time gives a sense of the 
shifting nature of the government’s initial response to the financial crisis, as well as the more 
deliberate process that ultimately led to the successful resolution of the crisis following 1985.   
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Allende government's nationalization 
of the banks and the military government's subsequent privatization plan.  Section 3 covers the run-
up to the 1981-83 financial crisis and details the initial measures taken to rescue the banks.  Section 
4 discusses the resurgence of protectionist trade policies during 1982-1984.  Section 5 chronicles the 
steps taken to recapitalize the financial system during 1985-96, including measures to write down 
dollar loans and emergency central bank loans.  Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
1 See also Arellano (1984), Larroulet (1987), Brock (1989), De la Cuadra and Valdés (1992), and Fontaine (1995).   2
 
2.  The 1974-75 Economic Crisis and Bank Privatization 
 
  When the Popular Unity government of Salvador Allende took power in November 1970, a 
prime objective was to obtain state control of the banks.  Although the government had no power to 
nationalize the banks, it authorized the Chilean Development Corporation (Corfo), a state agency, to 
buy bank shares at attractive prices.  The central bank opened a special line of credit with the Banco 
del Estado for this purpose.  Simultaneously, the government began to intervene in banks, citing 
either financial irregularities or labor problems, thereby signaling an intention to harass banks that 
attempted to remain private.  By using this carrot and stick approach the government obtained 
majority control of fourteen banks (which accounted for about 90 percent of all bank credit) as well 
as minority participation in three other banks by the end of 1971.  In addition to these banks, the 
government controlled the savings and loan system (SINAP), the Banco del Estado, as well as 
several other public credit institutions (Meller 1996, 147-49). 
  Following the nationalization of the banks, the government targeted credit toward the social 
(state) sector of the economy, so that at the time of the military coup in September 1973 about 50 
percent of bank credit was directed toward the state at a five percent nominal annual interest rate.  
Given the annual inflation rates of 163 percent in 1972 and 508 percent in 1973, this bank credit was 
extended at very negative real rates.  At the same time, commercial bank lending was capped in 
nominal terms by the use of credit ceilings by the Central Bank.  On the margin domestic credit was 
extended solely by the central bank, with commercial banks being relegated to the role of 
administrating the credit.   
  By the time of the military coup in September 1973, the financial system had become 
severely repressed and decapitalized.  The decapitalization of banks worsened as the economy 
moved toward a severe recession in which GDP fell by 13 percent in 1975.   During the height of the   3
recession the government began the process of privatizing the banks that had been nationalized by 
the Allende government.  The shares of the nationalized banks were held by the Chilean 
Development Corporation (Corfo).   The first notices of the sale appeared in the press in July 1975 
(Valdés 1988).  The terms of the sale were 20 percent down with the remainder to be paid in 8 
quarterly installments.  Corfo lent the remainder at an inflation-indexed (real) interest rate of 8 
percent.2   
  A law passed in December 1974 had limited concentration of ownership in banking to 1.5 
percent for a natural person and 3 percent for a judicial person.  Nevertheless, these provisions were 
circumvented by the creation of shell companies and interlocking groups of firms, with the tacit 
blessing of the government (the law was rescinded in 1978).  Ownership of banks became highly 
concentrated and banks were highly leveraged.  Lüders (1990) refers to this privatization as the debt-
led divestiture of government-controlled banks. Partially as a result of the high leverage, banks were 
undercapitalized and subject to tight liquidity constraints.   
In spite of some of these problems, the privatization process of the banks in 1975 and early 
1976 initially appeared to have been a structural success which also generated revenue for the 
government from the sale of the banks.  But subsequent behavior by banks demonstrated the 
existence of deep-seated problems tied to connected lending.  For example, in January 1977 the 
Central Bank intervened in the operations of Banco Osorno.  The intervention was associated with 
the failure of an informal sector financiera named Manuel Rodríguez.  The owners of Banco Osorno 
had used funds from Manuel Rodríguez (which they also owned) to purchase Banco Osorno from 
Corfo, thereby circumventing Corfo's capital and concentration requirements. 
                                                 
2 There is evidence that the highly-leveraged purchases resulted in inflated prices for the banks.  Corfo had set the book 
value of the banks as the minimum bid price, which substantially exceeded the value of most banks based on stock 
market values.  Between September 1975 and February 1976 eleven banks were sold to the private sector for $118 
million dollars, a figure which substantially exceeded Corfo's own estimate prior to the sale.   4
  One of the first systemic indicators of a financial sector problem was the very high loan rate 
following the privatization.  Column (4) of Table 1 indicates an impressively rapid growth of private 
domestic credit, starting from a low base.  Nevertheless, column (5) indicates that the simple rolling 
over of the July 1976 stock of private domestic credit at the real loan rate would account for about 
80 percent of the observed increase between July 1976 and June 1979.3   
De la Cuadra and Valdés (1992) have noted that contemporaneous rumors in the Chilean 
press suggested that between 10 and 15 percent of the banking system's loan portfolio was non-
performing.  Harberger (1985) maintained that this non-performing loan portfolio created a "false" 
demand for credit:  banks rolled over the loans and capitalized the interest payment with the loans, 
even though the loans would never be paid.  De la Cuadra and Valdés (1992, p. 69) have argued that 
the real growth of the banking system's loans would have partially diluted the bad loans.  If the non-
performing loans had been 10 percent of the banking system's portfolio in 1977, by 1979 they would 
have only been 7.7 percent.  Even if the bad loans were not creating a "bubble" in the banking 
system, the volume of bad loans in June 1979 almost certainly compromised much of the banking 
system's book value capital.4  This sort of balance sheet weakness created a moral hazard that 
increased bankers’ incentives for risk-taking and for over-extension of new credit. 
 
3.  The 1981-83 Economic Crisis and Bank Rescue 
 
  Following the intervention in Banco Osorno in 1977, the Superintendency of Banks began a 
several year process to improve bank supervision.  In early 1978 revisions to the banking law 
required that all banks have external audits whose results would be published in nationally-
circulated newspapers.  In early 1979 Price Waterhouse reported that Banco Español was in 
                                                 
3 That is, approximately (79+45+32)/(90+79+21)≈0.8 of the increase in credit could be attributed to this rollover of 
credit. 
4It was not until the period between July 1979 and June 1981 that domestic credit to the private sector outstripped the 
real loan rate.  In those two years the real stock of private sector domestic credit doubled while the cumulative real loan   5
excellent condition.  But a year later the 1980 audit reported that 37 percent of the loans were of 
doubtful quality.  Following this revelation, the Superintendency required banks to rate the quality 
of their 30 largest loans on a risk scale from A to D.  Several institutions were unable to identify 
their borrowers or to document the uses of the loans.  The Superindency then expanded the loan 
classification requirement in June 1980 to the largest 80 loans of each bank, and then to the 300 
largest in April 1981.  The information revealed by the loan classifications resulted in the November 
1981 government intervention in eight banks and financieras that represented thirteen percent of the 
banking system’s assets (De la Cuadra and Valdés 1992). 
Bank regulations were further tightened in late 1981 to place strict limits on the 
concentration of ownership of banks, thereby attempting to reverse the initial concentration that took 
place at the time of the 1975 privatization.  The stricter guidelines on ownership concentration and 
on information provision on loan portfolios went into force as the economy slipped into recession in 
late 1981.  The subsequent 1982 world recession and high dollar interest rates added to the severity 
of the banking collapse by making the fixed exchange rate impossible to defend. 
  On June 15, 1982 Chile devalued its exchange rate by 15 percent.  At the time of the 
devaluation the government created a preferential dollar exchange rate for dollar debtors.  This step 
was taken because of the government's previous implicit guarantee that the 39 peso/dollar fixed 
exchange rate would be a permanent anchor for the economy.  In addition, on September 1 the 
Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions allowed banks to use the June 30 exchange rate 
when calculating the peso value of their dollar liabilities.  This represented a 35 percent 
underestimation of the value of dollar liabilities by the end of 1982, but prevented a number of banks 
from violating minimum regulatory capital ratios.  Banks were originally to provision against these 
losses by the end of 1982, but were later given an extension until the end of 1986.   
                                                                                                                                                                   
rate was less than 40 percent.  It should be noted that this expansion occurred after the June1979 fixing of the exchange 
rate and involved extensive dollar borrowing.   6
  On July 12, 1982, two weeks after the devaluation the central bank announced (Accord 1450) 
that it would buy part of a bank's nonperforming loan portfolio at face value.  As a counterpart to 
this transaction the bank would agree to buy back the portfolio over a period of three to five years.  
The repayment terms were UF + 16.5 percent for peso loans (where UF, Unidad de Fomento, is an 
indexation mechanism that is tied to the consumer price index) and LIBOR + 6 percent for dollar 
loans.  This action improved the balance sheets of banks by replacing nonperforming assets with a 
central bank bond, but because the central bank bond was not interest bearing and was not 
transferable, there was no transfer of resources to the banks.  There was, of course, a contingent 
transfer created for those banks that would not be able to repurchase their nonperforming loans 
within the three to five year period. 
  The intervention in the flagship banks of the two largest economic conglomerates (Banco de 
Chile of the Vial group and Banco de Santiago of the Cruzat-Larraín group) on January 13, 1983 
terminated the creation of shell companies and other measures that were being used to evade 
prudential regulations.  This step resulted in more than 50 percent of financial system assets and 
liabilities falling under direct control of the government and the additional explicit state backing of 
the liabilities of the remaining institutions.  The step also gave the government control of a number 
of the largest firms in the economy. 
  A major departure of the government from its previous policy that all bank debt, both 
external and domestic, was private and not guaranteed by the government came shortly after the 
bank interventions.  Law number 18,203 of January 15, 1983 extended the government's guarantee 
to bank deposits and other liabilities.  Although the law created a huge contingent liability for the 
government, it prevented a run on the banks and converted the banks' external debt into sovereign 
debt that would prevent the forced liquidation of banks by foreign creditors. 
  By early 1983 it had become clear that many debtors would not be able to repay their loans at 
the contracted terms.  In response to the growing threat of a widespread debtor revolt, the   7
government announced a "productive debtor" restructuring plan (Accord 1507) on April 12, 1983.  
The plan rescheduled 30 percent of an eligible company's debts at UF + 7 percent for a period of 11 
years, with a one-year grace period for interest and a five-year grace period for principal.  To 
provide the banks with an incentive to restructure the debts, the Central Bank lent the banks an 
amount equivalent to the restructured loans at UF + 5 percent (with the same grace periods as the 
restructured loans).  As counterpart to this operation, the banks were required to use the Central 
Bank's loan to buy 6-year Central Bank pagarés that paid UF + 12 percent.  The operation, therefore, 
did not result in an immediate expansion of domestic credit but rather created a flow subsidy to the 
banks of 7 percent (12-5) of the amount of the restructured loans.5   
  The last major stabilization measure involved the creation of a program for home mortgages 
(Accord 1517, June 29, 1983) that rescheduled unpaid installments since 1981.  Restructured 
mortgages were made at UF + 8 percent with a maturity that was extended to incorporate the unpaid 
installments. 
  By one year after the June 1982 devaluation, all the stabilization measures were in place for 
the financial system.  Three of the programs were substantially modified during the second year 
following the devaluation.  The repurchase of banks' bad debt was expanded on February 9, 1984 
(Accord 1555), the productive debtor plan was extended in June 1984, and the home mortgage 
refinancing plan was augmented in July 1984.  However, none of these stabilization measures 
resulted in any restructuring of the financial system.  The largest banks and the largest enterprises 





                                                 
5 This flow subsidy was the carrot to encourage the banks to restructure their loans.  Out of 130,150 eligible debtors, 
48,200 participated in the program, with about 39 percent of the eligible debt reprogrammed.   8
 
4. Trade Policy 
 
Trade policy during 1982-1984 tended to mirror the general confusion in the government 
regarding the appropriate response to the economic crisis.  During this period Chilean policy turned 
the economy increasingly inward.  Former president Alessandri (1958-64) and other conservatives 
argued that the economy needed to return to restrictive tariffs.  In mid-November 1982 the 
government abandoned the uniform 10 percent tariff and imposed duties on 20 products (20 percent 
on canned fish products, 31 percent on cement, 12 percent on matches, etc.).  On March 24, 1983 the 
tariff was raised to a uniform 20 percent for a period that was to last until October 1984.  Both of 
these measures were undertaken by finance ministers who essentially represented continuity with the 
economic liberalization undertaken during the 1970s and early 1980s. 
  On July 19, 1984 an avowedly protectionist minister raised the tariff to 35 percent on 240 
"luxury" imports.  The plan was to set up a system of differential tariffs that could be used to create 
high effective rates of protection for favored industries.  A large outcry by manufacturers forced an 
abandonment of the differential tariffs in favor of a uniform 35 percent tariff.6  On September 17, 
two years and three months after the initial devaluation, the economic team announced the 35 
percent tariff and simultaneously devalued the exchange rate by 20 percent (from 93 to 115 
pesos/dollar).  The devaluation was a hastily chosen measure in response to a rapidly deteriorating 
trade balance which had fallen from a surplus of US$230 million during each of the first and second 
quarters of 1984 to $3 million in July and negative $57.1 million in August.  The decline in the trade 
balance rapidly reduced the Central Bank's international reserves and jeopardized Chile's standby 
loan program with the IMF. 
                                                 
6 See Lederman and Edwards (1998) for an extensive discussion of tariff policy during this time period.   9
  During the fourth quarter of 1984 the inflation rate rose to 51 percent (compared to 14 
percent during the first half of the year) and by November and December ex-post real interbank rates 
were about 28 percent (compared to an average ex-post real rate of 12 percent for the first half of the 
year).  By the end of 1984 the finance minister and economy minister were publicly quarreling about 
economic policy, leading the IMF team in charge of negotiating the standby agreement to let it be 
known that it wanted to hear a single voice.  (Latin American Weekly Report, 12/14/1984) 
 
5.  Recapitalizing the Financial System, 1985-1996 
 
After a cumulative 15 percent decline in 1982 and 1983, real GDP grew by 6.3 percent in 
1984.7  But Table 2 shows that the resumption of growth in 1984 was a false indicator of the Chilean 
economy's recovery:  the growth was accompanied by a worsening of the trade balance, an increase 
of the current account deficit to 10.7 percent of GDP, and an increase in the fiscal deficit.   
The crisis that Chile faced in the latter half of 1984 was due to an economy whose recovery 
was running out of steam in the face of great uncertainty regarding the allocation of financial system 
losses, the ownership of firms, and the direction of trade policy.  Economic policies undertaken in 
Chile during the two years following the initial devaluation had succeeded in temporarily stabilizing 
the economy.  The stabilization of the financial system consisted largely of short-term and long-term 
measures to ensure the liquidity of the system.  Although the restoration of liquidity stabilized the 
means-of-payment function of the banking system and prevented bank runs, even long-term 
assistance to banks and debtors was failing to address the underlying solvency problems in the 
financial system.  Moving from stabilization to restructuring of the financial system required a 
policy switch away from liquidity provision toward an emphasis on the resolution of private 
ownership rights, including the adoption of mechanisms to allocate financial losses among 
                                                 
7 During 1982 and 1983 real domestic expenditure fell by 25 percent, reflecting the sharp decline of capital inflows to 
the economy.   10
shareholders, foreign and domestic debtholders, and taxpayers (via operations of the central bank or 
treasury).  It also required a clear signal on the direction of trade policy. 
  When a new finance minister was appointed in early 1985, he quickly addressed the issue of 
trade policy by reducing tariffs to 30 percent in March 1985 and lowering them again on January 1, 
1986 to a pre-announced level of 25 percent.  The resolution of property rights and the allocation of 
financial losses also began in earnest in 1985.  Two of the important structural adjustments that took 
place in the financial system beginning in 1985 concerned the treatment of dollar loans and 




  At the time of the June 1982 devaluation commercial banks' dollar liabilities accounted for 
half of Chile's external debt.  The commercial banks' dollar liabilities had been passed on to 
domestic borrowers as dollar loans.  The real depreciation of the exchange rate hurt the ability of 
borrowers (especially those in nontraded activities) to repay dollar loans.  The Central Bank 
responded, as discussed above, by establishing a preferential exchange rate for dollar borrowers.  
The favorable treatment given to dollar debtors was augmented in an important way during the 
middle of 1984.  On May 25
th of that year a plan to reprogram loans permitted dollar loans up to US 
$540,000 to be converted into CPI-indexed loans, with the Central Bank bearing the risk of a real 
devaluation of the currency.  Ambiguous wording in the law allowed four banks to expand the loan 
conversion plan beyond its original intent, so that they undertook US $200 million in loan 
conversions between the beginning of August and mid-September.  At the time of the 20 percent 
devaluation in mid-September, other banks demanded equal treatment and all banks were given until 
                                                 
8 Under the new finance minister fiscal austerity was also renewed. Domestic expenditure fell relative to output and, as a 
consequence, the trade account swung from a deficit of 1.1 percent of GDP in 1984 to a surplus of 2.8 percent in 1985.  
These trade surpluses were maintained throughout the remainder of the 1980s.  The move from trade deficit to trade 
surplus required an additional 25 percent depreciation of the real exchange rate in order to switch expenditure away 
from traded goods. See Table 2, column 6: 61 (1986)/86 (1984).   11
October 15 to convert eligible dollar loans into CPI-indexed loans at the pre-devaluation exchange 
rate. 
  When the new finance minister took over in 1985 he pressed the argument with foreign 
creditors that the Chilean government had provided assistance of US$3.4 billion (about 20 percent of 
Chile’s GDP) to help borrowers repay their dollar loans, and that now it was time for the creditor 
banks to bear their share of the losses.  The creditor banks were pressing Chile to renew its 
guarantee on the Chilean banks' debt, especially since much of the debt was maturing during 1985-
87.  (Latin America Weekly Report, 5/31/1985)  Out of this negotiation came Chile's agreement to 
renew its guarantee on bank debt, combined with creditor banks' tacit approval for the creation of 
debt buyback and debt-equity conversion mechanisms.  Between mid-1985 and mid-1987 about 
US$3.2 billion of bank debt was written down or converted into equity by these mechanisms at 
market discounts of about 30 percent (Larraín and Velasco 1990).  
   The preferential exchange rate, the conversion of dollar loans into CPI-indexed loans, and 
the debt buyback/debt-equity conversion mechanisms were three important ways in which the 
Central Bank rescued dollar debtors.  Without these rescue measures, it is questionable whether the 




  Between 1982 and 1984 seventeen private national banks sold nonperforming loans to the 
Central Bank in exchange for Central Bank bonds, as shown in Table 3.  The two largest banks, 
Banco de Santiago and Banco de Chile, were among the banks with the worst loan portfolios.   
During the first half of 1984 a special commission created to propose solutions to the problem of the 
intervened banks recommended capitalizing a portion of the Central Bank's loans to those banks.  
The proposals resulted in the passage on January 26, 1985 of the law on "popular capitalism" (Law 
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18,401).  The law provided a mechanism for recapitalizing four of the five intervened banks.9  The 
law allowed the Superintendency to require that banks be recapitalized to a level that made them 
financially viable.  Existing stockholders had first claim on stock purchases, followed by third 
parties.  The remainder of the stock was given to Corfo (the Chilean Development Corporation), 
which purchased a nominal amount equivalent to the Central Bank's emergency credits to the 
intervened banks (so that the emergency credits were capitalized). 
  The capital was then sold in small amounts to individual investors.  A down payment of five 
percent was required, with the remainder of the financing provided by Corfo over 10 years at UF + 5 
percent.  Buyers with no tax arrears could finance the purchase over 15 years at UF + 0 percent.  In 
addition, dividends were exempt from taxes.  Hachette and Lüders (1993) have estimated the 
government’s subsidy was about 40 percent of the cost of the shares, which could be justified partly 
as an offset to the future tax liabilities associated with the bank bailout. 
  The law created three classes of shares.  Class 'A' shares were pre-intervention shares and 
could not pay dividends until a bank's loans from the Central Bank had been repaid.  Class 'B' 
shares, the shares created by popular capitalism, were entitled to dividends from operating profits 
that remained after paying back the installment on the Central Bank's loans.  Class 'C' shares were 
issued to new investors (who had not used the popular capitalism program) and had equal claim with 
the Central Bank to dividends based on operating profits.  Because the government was worried 
about the difficulty of attracting new equity capital for the banks, the law specified that the new 
'popular' capitalists could choose to capitalize their dividends.  The capitalized dividends would 
automatically turn into class 'C' shares.  By December 31, 1986 all the new shares of stock had been 
sold.  The number of stockholders in Banco de Chile increased from 17,700 to 39,222 and in Banco 
de Santiago from 15 to 15,871. 
                                                 
9 These were Banco de Chile, de Santiago, Internacional, and Concepción.  The fifth bank, Colocadora Nacional de 
Valores was merged with Banco de Santiago.     13
  The sale of the nonperforming loan portfolio to the Central Bank during 1982-1984 carried 
with it an obligation to repurchase the portfolio over a contractually set period of a number of years.  
If at any point a bank failed to make its yearly payment, the Central Bank could seize control of the 
bank.  In 1989 the outgoing military government redrafted the agreements between the banks and the 
Central Bank.  In place of a fixed obligation, the new law created 'subordinated debt' that was equal 
in nominal value to the fixed obligation, but which had no fixed timetable of payments.  The new 
contracts with the Central Bank were guaranteed protection by the law against unilateral changes by 
the Central Bank.  In the cases of Banco Santiago and Banco de Chile, the Central Bank was entitled 
to 70 percent of operating profits, with the remaining 30 percent going to holders of class B stock 
(the popular capitalists).  For these heavily indebted banks, as well as for Banco Concepción, BHIF, 
and Banco Internacional, there was effectively no date at which the subordinated debt would ever be 
repaid. 
  When the newly-elected democratic government took power in 1990, one of the pressing 
issues was an acceptable resolution of the subordinated debt problem.  Table 4 shows that the total 
value of the subordinated debt of eleven banks in 1991 reached about US$3.3 billion while the value 
of paid-in capital was only $1.3 billion.  In September 1991 the finance minister stated that the 
problem needed to be solved right away (El Mercurio, 8 Sept. 1991).  Despite renewed efforts in 
1992 and 1993, the government made no appreciable progress in drafting a law that would replace 
the subordinated debt law and which would be acceptable to the banks. 
  The subordinated debt law maintained the right of stockholders to automatically capitalize 
their dividends.  In 1994 the class 'B' shareholders of Banco de Chile and Banco Santiago voted to 
capitalize their dividends and receive class 'C' shares in return.  Both because the Central Bank 
feared the loss of income associated with class 'C' shares and because it wished to prevent the 
growth of the capital base (and loan capacity) of the two banks, the Central Bank viewed the 
capitalization of dividends as a threat.   14
  In response the government passed a law in early 1995 prohibiting stockholders from 
capitalizing dividends until the subordinated debt obligation was extinguished.  The Constitutional 
Tribunal proceeded to declare the law unconstitutional.  The government then entered into talks with 
the banks which produced an agreement in April 1995 to solve the subordinated debt problem.  The 
solution (which was eventually embodied in Law 19,396) created mechanisms for the banks to repay 
part of their debt in exchange for forgiveness of the remainder.  The banks also had the opportunity 
to repay the value of their debt in 40 annual installments.  The law established a July 23, 1996 
deadline for coming to an agreement with the Central Bank (July 18, 1997 for banks that chose to 
merge with another bank). 
  During the intense period of negotiations in June 1996, the Central Bank president became 
convinced that the banks were being let off too easy, to the detriment of the Central Bank's net 
worth.  The Central Bank president resigned on June 28 over this issue and left his successor to 
negotiate the final agreements. Banco Santiago eventually agreed to give the Central Bank a greater 
proportion of its shares (38.5 instead of 35.5 percent) as its payment to extinguish the debt. 
  Of the total subordinated debt obligation of about US$4.6 billion, the Banco de Chile  agreed 
to pay off its debt of US$1.7 billion in equal installments of $100 million over forty years.  Of the 
remaining $2.9 billion of subordinated debt, the Central Bank wrote off approximately US$1.6 
billion as follows:  a US$200 million writeoff for BHIF in exchange for a payment of US$174 
million, a $480 million writeoff for Banco Concepción in exchange for a payment of $170 million, a 
$106 million writeoff for Banco Internacional in exchange for a payment of $25 million, and a $800 
million writeoff for Banco Santiago in exchange for stock with an estimated value of $900 million. 
  The intervention and recapitalization of the largest banks altered the ownership structure of 
the Chilean economy.  The Cruzat-Larraín group, which had controlled Banco Santiago, lost 90 
percent of its assets and control over the bank.  In 1996 control of Banco Santiago passed to the 
Luksic group, which controlled Banco O'Higgins and emerged during the mid-1980s as one of the   15
dynamic groups.  The Vial group lost control of Banco de Chile and approximately 30 nonfinancial 
companies.  Other groups, such as Grupo Angelini, also emerged stronger from the financial 
restructuring process.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
  Bank privatization in 1975 in Chile had as its goal the transfer of decision-making authority 
from the government to the private sector.  This goal reflected a belief that state-owned banks did 
not have the incentives to choose investment projects as well as the private sector, and that the 
public sector could not impose hard budget constraints on these state-controlled banks.   
  The privatization of banks in Chile accompanied a significant trade liberalization as well as 
other reforms. These reforms tried to decentralize decision making in the economy.  The reforms 
envisioned that entrepreneurs would actively search out new products for which there was an 
international market, and banks would provide the financing to channel resources toward new 
productive activities.  In practice, the initial bank privatization turned out to be a temporary 
privatization:  the Central Bank was forced to intervene in the operations of privatized banks, first in 
1977 in Banco Osorno and then during 1981-83 in numerous banks, because privatized banks 
became insolvent or undercapitalized.    
  The process by which the 1975 privatizations led to the future bailouts by the government 
was tied to the contingent nature of the transfer of ownership to the private sector.  When banks 
were sold it was not clear to what extent the government would protect depositors and other lenders 
to the banks.  The bailout of Banco Osorno in January 1977 was a watershed event in the post-
privatization process because it solidified the implicit understanding that public money would be 
used to help banks in trouble.  That understanding and the difficulty of implementing prudential 
supervision of banks between 1978 and 1980 created a contingent government guarantee that was 
valuable to bank owners who wished to loan to risky projects or to expand bank assets much faster   16
than was prudent.  The bank bailouts of 1981-83 were created by a series of pressures and policy 
decisions that turned the contingent guarantee to protect depositors and other creditors into a 
realized guarantee and which, in the process, returned the control of the banks to the government.   
  By 1984 it appeared questionable whether Chile was capable of resolving the financial crisis 
in a stable macroeconomic environment.  It was only in 1985 when the debt conversion plans 
transferred some of the losses to foreign banks that the recapitalization of Chilean banks began to 
involve private lenders rather than the government.  In addition, the Popular Capitalism program 
effectively transferred a substantial amount of the bad debt of the intervened banks off the balance 
sheet of the Central Bank and onto the balance sheet of Corfo (the Chilean Development 
Corporation).   Finally, individual banks were forced to recapitalize themselves by repurchasing the 
nonperforming loans that they had sold to the Central Bank during 1982-1984.  When the remaining 
subordinated debt was extinguished in 1996 the banks were better capitalized and supervised than 
had been the case 20 years earlier.10   
Despite the pessimism that accompanied the early stages of the banking crisis, the fifteen-
year process of intervention, restructuring, and recapitalization left the financial system well-
positioned to finance the economy’s economic expansion, which averaged six percent per year (in 
real terms) during the 20 years following 1985.    
 
                                                 
10 Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe, and Soto (2002) find that Chile’s willingness “to pay the cost of reforming its banking 
system and of letting inefficient firms go bankrupt” was a key difference between the responses of Chile and Mexico to 
their respective financial crises in the 1980s.  The Chilean financial reforms led to much higher productivity (TFP) 
growth than in Mexico between 1987 and 1995.  See also Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) for corroborating results.    17
Detailed Chronology of Events: 
Bank Intervention and Recapitalization 
 
March 1979:  The Superintendency prohibits the accrual of interest on delinquent loans. 
 
February 1, 1980:  The Superintendency establishes an experimental loan classification system in 
which each bank must classify, on a scale from A to D, its thirty largest individual debtors. (Circular 
1662, Superintendencia de Bancos)   
 
June 1980:  The Superintendency requests that the classification be extended to the largest 80 
debtors of each bank. 
 
April 20, 1981:  The Superintendency requires the classification of the 300 largest debtors and 
introduces classification procedures for both consumer and housing mortgage loan portfolios. 
(Circular 1732) 
 
May 1981:  CRAV group (Sugar refinery) fails, threatening to pull down some banks. 
  
August 1981:  The military junta approves an amendment to the banking law which states: 
"Failure to diversify loans away from persons and societies linked, either directly or indirectly, to a 
bank through ownership or management will signify that the bank is managed in a deficient way."  
(Latin American Weekly Report 9/11/81). 
 
September 14, 1981:  In response to the August amendment to the banking law, the Superintendency 
issues a circular (1749) which delimits connected lending and drastically curtails its use by the 
financial groups.  Banks are given three months to comply.  In response, banks set up many shell 
companies.  
 
November 1981:  As a direct result of the loan classification procedure, the Superintendency takes 
over eight banks and financieras (of which Banco Español is the largest).  These institutions account 
for 13 percent of financial system loans. 
 
March 11, 1982:  Loan loss provisioning is permitted to take place over 36 months, as a result of the 
rising quantity of bad loans (Circular 1786). 
 
June 15, 1982:  The peso is devalued. 
A preferential dollar exchange rate is established to help dollar debtors pay back their debts. 
 
June 18, 1982:  The Superintendency announces a new limit on connected lending of 5 percent of 
total loans, which must be met by a five semester plan (Circular 1808). 
 
June 30, 1982:  The Central Bank begins to pay interest on reserve requirements at the average 
deposit rate of interest.  The payment is made with non-transferable Central Bank pagarés of five 
year maturity that pay UF + 5 (UF is a CPI-based unit of account). 
 
July 12, 1982:  The Central Bank begins to buy bank's loan portfolios at face value, with the 
provision that the banks must repurchase the loans at face value over time with 100 percent of their 
profits.  The terms:  UF +16.5 for peso loans, LIBOR + 6 (repayment periods of 3-5 years) for dollar 
loans.   18
 
September 1, 1982:  The Superintendency allows banks to use, for accounting purposes, the June 30 
exchange rate when calculating the value of their dollar liabilities.  This prevents banks from 
violating minimum capital ratios.  This provision gives banks until December 1983 to incorporate 
the exchange rate devaluation on their books (additional forbearance mechanisms are established in 
1983). 
 
October 8, 1982:  The 30 day time limit to declare a loan non-performing failing payment is 
extended to 90 days. 
 
November 1982:  In an effort to stop the rollover of loan losses, the Superintendency publishes a 
circular, Process of Definition of Bank Debtor Solvency.  According to De la Cuadra and Valdés 
(1992, pp. 82-3): 
    
Numerous inspectors and members of the banks' operating staffs revised the banks' 
evaluations of recovery of their debtors, and many debtors had to prepare a presentation to their 
banks to show that they were still solvent or that they deserved a rescheduling. 
The publicly announced outcome of the evaluation process was as follows:  A volume of 
110,688 billion Chilean pesos of debt [about 9 percent of 1982 GDP] was due by "nonviable" 
debtors, so their guarantees would be seized and the banks would have to request their 
bankruptcy.  In addition, the volume of debt owed by debtors defined as "in difficulty" was 
315,107 billion Chilean pesos, and these debtors were made eligible for the sought-after 
rescheduling. 
In response many debtors rushed to shift collateral out of debtor corporations.  Banks, on 
the other hand, dragged their feet on both bankruptcy proceedings and rescheduling. 
 
November 26, 1982:  A repurchase mechanism for dollars sold to the Central Bank ("Swaps") is 
established. (Circlar 1860) 
 
December 1982-February 1985:  The Central Bank "suggests" the 30-day interest rate.  During these 
two years and three months, the president of the Central Bank defends the policy (5/9/84) as the only 
one that can reduce the cost of credit to a level compatible with that necessary for the recovery of 
productive activities.  This policy's effectiveness depends on the state control of the majority of the 
banking system. 
 
January 13, 1983:  The Superintendency takes over the flagship banks of the Vial group (Banco de 
Chile) and the Cruzat-Larraín group (Banco de Santiago), intervenes in another three smaller banks, 
and forces the liquidation of another three financial institutions.  The authorities take control of the 
business groups by refusing to renew thirty-day loans to the companies affiliated with the banks, 
thereby forcing them into bankruptcy, with the creditors' committees dominated by the flagship 
banks. 
 
1983:  The Bankruptcy Law is reformed, privatizing the function of a bankruptcy syndicate, whose 
management is the responsibility of a Junta de Acreedores.  This reform facilitates the bankruptcy 
process of numerous finance companies, companies related to economic groups, and many small and 
medium enterprises.   
 
March 31, 1983:  Payment of interest on demand deposits in pesos is prohibited. (Circular 1900) 
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April 12, 1983:  Productive Debtor Reprogramming Directive (Accord 1507):  51 percent of banking 
sector loans are classified as debts to "productive debtors".  39 percent of the eligible debt is 
reprogrammed (i.e., about 20 percent of total bank loans).  48,200 debtors out of 130,150 participate 
in the program. 
 
The program reschedules up to 30 percent of a debtor's debts at terms of UF + 7 percent, with a one 
year grace period for interest and a five year grace period for principal.  In order to induce banks to 
reschedule loans, the Central Bank creates a mechanism that generates an annual cash flow to the 
banks equal to 7 percent of the stock of rescheduled loans for six years.  This mechanism consists in 
having the Central Bank make loans to the banks at UF + 5 (for ten years, with one year grace period 
on interest and five years grace period on principal) and in exchange having the banks use the 
proceeds to buy 6-year Central Bank pagarés that pay UF + 12.   
 
April 28, 1983:  Payment of interest on demandable savings accounts is prohibited. 
 
June 29, 1983:  The Central Bank (Accord 1517) establishes a refinancing mechanism for home 
mortgage holders.  The plan reschedules installments unpaid since 1981 and a decreasing amount of 
installments payable between 1983 and 1987.  Loan maturities are extended to take into account the 
lower installments.  The rescheduled loans are at UF + 8.  The Central Bank purchases part of the 
rescheduled loans at UF + 8 and refinances the remainder with a line of credit at UF +7. 
 
July 19, 1983:  Loan loss provisioning established in 1982 is now allowed to take place over 60 
months, with a termination date of December 31, 1986. 
 
December 1983:  Financial normalization mechanism.  The Central Bank buys substandard loans of 
non-intervened banks up to an amount equal to 1.5 times capital and reserves.  The banks must use 
the funds to buy back the emergency loans from 1982, and must then invest the remainder in Central 
Bank pagarés that pay UF + 7 with a four-year maturity.  The banks are required to repurchase the 
nonperforming loans at a 5 percent real interest rate over ten years. Banks are also permitted to 
exchange an additional amount of loans equal to 100 percent of capital and reserves for a non-
transferable, non-interest bearing central bank note.  Loans purchased this way must be repurchased 
at their initial real value over a ten year period.  Bank shareholders are required to dedicate all 
earnings to the repurchase of the loans.   
 
1984:  Tax reform eliminates the high marginal income tax on company profits, provided that the 
profits are used to recapitalize the firms (i.e., dividends continue to be taxed at high rates).  This 
reform is in place for one year.   
 
June 1984:  The 1983 debt relief scheme is expanded.   
 
July 5, 1984:  The Central Bank (Accord 1583) augments the home mortgage refinancing program of 
June 20, 1983. 
 
September 1984:  De-dollarization of debts: small and medium-sized borrowers are allowed to 
prepay their debts with a new credit in domestic currency.  The exchange rate used is the preferential 
exchange rate. The cost of the program is absorbed by the Central Bank. 
 
February 18, 1985:  Hernán Bücchi becomes finance minister 
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1985-86:  The Capitalismo Popular program removes bad bank debt from the Central Bank's balance 
sheet and transfers it to Corfo (the Chilean Development Corporation).  As part of the process, new 
stock shares in the intervened banks are sold at concessionary rates to taxpayers who do not have tax 
arrears. 
 
June 27, 1985:  The preferential exchange rate begins to be phased out over an 18 month period 
(1/18 of the spread between the preferential and the official is eliminated each month), terminating 
in December 1986 for debtors with debts greater than $50,000.  The preferential exchange rate is 
kept for debts under $50,000.  
 
1982-1985:  Real exchange rate policy and interest rate stabilization (Fontaine 1995, p. 30): 
 
It is worth emphasizing that there is nothing as effective as a correct level of the real 
exchange rate for gaining the confidence of domestic savers and foreign lenders.  The 
pronounced real devaluations of the peso between 1982 and 1985, in spite of their traumatic 
short-run consequences, had the virtue of absolutely eliminating expectations of new 
devaluations.  Moreover, if there was any perception of disequilibrium, it was that the peso 
was undervalued and that its next real movement would be upward.  The counterpart of 
confidence in the real value of the peso was that interest rates could fall substantially without 
setting off capital flight.  The stabilization of interest rates was therefore intimately tied to the 
new exchange rate equilibrium. 
 
1986-88:  Debt buybacks, Debt-equity swaps (see Larraín and Velasco 1990) 
 
March 5, 1988:  The president of the Central Bank, Enrique Seguel, announces a new program for 
home mortgages.  Eligible mortgage holders--112,000 out of 140,000 total in the financial system--
can participate in an Article 18 dollar debt repurchase operation.  The Central Bank forgoes its 
normal commission charge.  Borrowers who have not previously rescheduled their mortgage loans 
receive a discount of 25 percent on an amount up to US$6000.  Previously rescheduled mortgages 
are eligible for a 15 percent discount on up to US$6000.  The rescheduled mortgage installments 
incorporate the value of the debt writedown.  The Central Bank plans to finance about US$300 
million dollars of operations for this mortgage relief program, and will lose about $30-35 million by 
not charging its usual commission.  (El Mercurio, International Edition, March 3-9, 1988)  
 
1989:  The outgoing military government changes the contracts with the banks that had sold 
nonperforming loans to the Central Bank.  The Central Bank's claims on the banks are turned into 
subordinated debt with no fixed time obligation for repayment. 
 
1994:  Class 'B' Shareholders at Banco de Chile and Banco Santiago create a crisis for the Central 
Bank by voting to capitalize their dividends, a move that may potentially impede the repayment of 
the Central Bank's subordinated debt.   
 
1995-96:  The government and the banks enter into intensive talks that produce a resolution of the 
subordinated debt problem.  The Central Bank agrees to realize a loss of US$1.6 billion in exchange 
for payments of US$1.3 billion.  The largest bank (Banco de Chile) agrees to pay off its debt 

























































1976  25.9 -- 4.7 --  -- 3.5 
1977  25.9  -0.1 8.8  89.6 79.1 9.9 
1978  31.8 23.0 15.8 79.3  45.3  8.2 
1979  29.6 -6.8 19.0 20.7  31.9  8.3 
1980  32.2 8.7  25.5  34.0 13.5 7.8 
1981  38.7 20.3 39.3 54.1  21.3  5.5 
1982  64.0 65.1 61.4 56.4  45.7  -14.1 
 
Source:  International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.  Domestic credit is line 32 
and domestic credit to the private sector is line 32d.  All domestic credit figures are for the end of 
the second quarter of each year.  Real domestic credit uses the GDP deflator. 
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Table 2 
































1980  7.8 9.3 4.2  7.1  -4.5  100 
1981 5.5  11.6  10.3  14.5  -0.8  115 
1982 -14.1  -24.1  1.9  9.2  3.5  (8.8)  103 
1983  -0.7 -4.6 -2.7  5.4  3.2  (7.5)  86 
1984  6.3 8.5 1.1  10.7  4.3  (9.1)  82 
1985 2.4  -1.9  -2.8  8.3  2.5  (9.8)  67 
1986 5.7  5.3  -3.8  6.9  2.1  (5.0)  61 
1987 5.7  7.3  -4.1  4.3  0.2  (1.5)  58 
1988 7.4  8.9  -7.2  0.7  -0.1  55 
1989 10.0  12.2  -3.6  3.1  -1.2  56 
 
*Figures in parentheses include estimates of quasi-fiscal (Central Bank) subsidies. 
Source:  Corbo and Fischer (1994)   23
 
Table 3 
Central Bank Loans to Chilean Banks at the End of 1983 
 
  Central Bank Loans/ 
Capital and Reserves 
(percent) 
Loans as a Percentage of 
the Whole Financial 
System 
I.  Intervened Banks     
Banco de Chile  400  22.0 
Banco Santiago  340  10.7 
Banco Concepción  360  4.6 
Banco Colocadora Nacional de Valores  350  2.0 
Banco Internacional  350  1.2 
 
II.  Private National Banks 
  
Banco de Crédito e Inversiones  80  5.5 
Banco Sud Americano  50  5.5 
Banco Hipotecario y de Fomento Nacional  120  3.6 
Banco del Trabajo  160  3.3 
Banco de A. Edwards  60  3.2 
Banco O'Higgins  50  3.1 
Banco Osorno y La Unión  50  2.1 
Banco Nacional  40  2.1 
Banco Morgan Finansa  50  1.5 
Banco Industrial y de Comercio Exterior  50  1.4 
Banco del Pacífico  40  0.6 
Banco del Desarrollo  180  0.4 
 












Source: Arellano (1984) 
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Table 4 
Central Bank Subordinated Debt in 1991 
 
 




I.  Intervened Banks     
Banco de Chile  1180  632 
Banco Santiago  1103  203 
Banco Concepción  387  53 
Banco Internacional  70  17 
 
II.  National Banks 
  
*Banco de Crédito e Inversiones  21  67 
*Banco Sud Americano  49  77 
  Banco Hipotecario y de Fomento Nacional  198  60 
*Banco de A. Edwards  102  64 
*Banco Osorno y La Unión  98  89 
*Banco del Pacífico  30  15 
*Banco del Desarrollo  12  24 
**Total 3250  1301 
 
*These banks extinguished their debt obligations between 1992 and 1995. 
**By July 1996 the total subordinated debt obligation had grown to about US$4.6 billion. 
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